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INTRODUCTION
Before 2008, prosecutions of banks had been quite rare in the federal
courts, and the criminal liability of banks and bankers was not a topic that
received much public or scholarly attention. In the wake of the last financial
crisis, however, critics have begun to ask whether prosecutors adequately held
banks and bankers accountable for their crimes. Senator Jeff Merkley
complained: "[A]fter the financial crisis, the [Justice] Department appears to
have firmly set the precedent that no bank, bank employee, or bank executive
can be prosecuted."' Federal judge Jed Rakoff and many others asked why
prosecutors brought, with one or two low-level exceptions, no prosecutions of
bankers in the wake of the 2007-2008 financial crisis and whether they were
too quick to settle corporate cases by merely compelling fines and "window-
dressing" compliance reforms.2 The response from the Department of Justice
(DOJ) to criticism of its approach towards corporate and financial prosecutions
has ranged from stem denial that it had been remiss -as when Attorney
General Eric Holder announced in a video message in 2014 that "[t]here is no
such thing as too big to jail" and that no financial institution "should be
considered immune from prosecution" - to reform in the face of
1. Press Release, Senator Jeff Merldey, Merkley Blasts 'Too Big to jail' Policy for Lawbreaking
Banks, (Dec. 13, 2012), http://www.merldey.senate.gov/news/press-releases/merldey-blasts
-too-big-to-jail-policy-for-lawbrealdng-banks [http://perma.cc/BY2U-GUE9].
2. Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been Prosecuted?,
N.Y. REV. BooKs (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2o14/ol/o9/financial
-crisis-why-no-executive-prosecutions/ [http://perma.cc/V5BQ-C2E9]; see also Robert
Quigley, The Impulse Towards Individual Criminal Punishment After the Financial Crisis, 22
VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 103 (2015); David Zaring, Litigating the Financial Crisis, too VA. L.
REv. 1405, 1410-11 (2014).
3. Jonathan Weil, There Is Still Such a Thing as 'Too Big to Jail," BLOOMBERGVIEW (May
6, 2014), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2o14-o5-o6/there-is-still-such-a-thing
-as-too-big-to-jail [http://perma.cc/37LT-6NEL].
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acknowledged lack of public confidence in its approach -as when the DOJ in
2015 adopted policies designed to make corporate prosecutions more effective.4
In this Essay, I describe the remarkable rise in the number of bank
prosecutions in recent years, as well as the still steeper rise in criminal penalties
imposed on banks. 2015 was the year that bank prosecutions finally came into
their own, both in the record-breaking size of the fines and in the numbers of
cases resolved. While the DOJ can claim marked achievements in recent years,
which I detail here, I nevertheless caution against treating these data as fully
answering critics' concerns. Despite the apparent rise of bank prosecutions,
important "too big to jail" concerns remain: prosecution deals are inadequate
both as punishments and as rehabilitative efforts designed to promote
compliance. Upon closer examination, the recent string of bank prosecutions,
while noteworthy, fails to address persistent concerns that deterrent fines are
not routinely imposed, that compliance tenns designed to rehabilitate firms are
not used effectively, and that individuals remain largely un-prosecuted.
In the sections that follow, I first describe the data on increasing corporate
penalties generally, as well as penalties levied by prosecutors against financial
institutions specifically, with a focus on 2015, a year in which prosecutors
obtained record bank fines and numbers of bank prosecutions.6 Second, I will
ask whether those penalties are adequate, by examining how seemingly large
sums paid may actually represent highly reduced penalties given what
prosecutors could have imposed on banks for the alleged conduct. Third, I ask
whether banks are being adequately deterred or rehabilitated, where some of
the same banks have engaged in repeated violations without suffering more
serious consequences, compliance terms appear not to be taken seriously or
compliance is unknown, and individuals are prosecuted only in a minority of
these cases. I conclude by discussing what might further enhance the ability of
4. U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-28.ooo, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS (NOV. 2015), http://www.justice.gov/usan/usam-9-28000-principles-fed
eral-prosecution-business-organizations [http://perma.cc/E58C-6 5 8T]; Press Release, Dep't
of Justice, Deputy Attorney General Sally Quillian Yates Delivers Remarks at New York
University School of Law Announcing New Policy on Individual Liability in Matters of
Corporate Wrongdoing (Sept. to, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy
-attorney-general-sally-quillian-yates-delivers-remarks-new-york-university-school [http://
perma.cc/CL4T-JPAR] ("Americans should never believe, even incorrectly, that one's
criminal activity will go unpunished simply because it was committed on behalf of a
corporation.").
5. See BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: How PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH
CORPORATIONS ch. 1 (2014) [hereinafter GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL]; Brandon L. Garrett,
The Corporate Criminal as Scapegoat, tot VA. L. REv. 1789 (2015) [hereinafter Garrett, The
Corporate Criminal].
6. Here, I define financial institutions broadly to include "a range of types of companies that
focus on financial transactions, including commercial banks, investment banks, insurance
companies, and brokerages." Garrett, The Corporate Criminal, supra note 5, at 1816.
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prosecutors to deter bank crime and rehabilitate banks, and I suggest that we
have reason to be optimistic that reforms will be taken seriously.
1. THE RISE IN BANK PENALTIES
In 2015, federal prosecutors settled a record number of cases with banks,
and in the process imposed record criminal penalties, which critics had
complained DOJ had failed to do in the past.7 Corporations paid record sums
exceeding $9 billion in penalties to federal prosecutors in 2015, and paid still
more to regulators and others. In the last decade, my data show that federal
prosecutors have set new records each year in corporate fines, breaking the
ones set the previous year. The figure below illustrates these data, hand-
collected from federal dockets in cases of plea agreements with companies and
from deferred and non-prosecution agreements with companies.
7. See supra notes 1-2.
8. Figure i updates data presented in GARRETT, Too BIG TO JAIL, supra note 5. The Appendix of
that book provides a detailed description of how these data were collected from public
sources, chiefly federal district court dockets, Department of Justice releases, requests made
to individual U.S. Attorney's Offices, and FOIA requests and litigation, see GARRETT, Too
BIG TO JAIL, supra note 5, at 297-301. Each of the deferred and non-prosecution agreements is
available in an online resource. See Brandon L. Garrett & Jon Ashley, Federal Organizational
Prosecution Agreements, U. VA. SCH. L., http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/prosecution
-agreements/home.suphp [http://perma.cc/QA9Z-R6BX] [hereinafter Garrett & Ashley,
Federal Organizational Prosecution Agreements]. Each of the plea agreements from 2001-2013
is available on a separate online resource website. See Brandon L.
Garrett & Jon Ashley, Federal Organizational Plea Agreements, U. VA. SCH.
L., http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/plea agreements/home.php [http://perma.cc
/ 4W1HG-DKKX] [hereinafter Garrett & Ashley, Federal Organizational Plea Agreements]. The
2014-2015 plea agreements are in the process of being added to that resource website, and
both resource websites will soon be combined in a single resource, which will additionally
permit users to search companies by status as public or privately-held companies, size of
fine, type of crime, and other characteristics, including whether they are a financial
institution. The cases to be added online are included in the Appendices to this Essay.
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Figure i.
FEDERAL CORPORATE CRIMINAL PENALTIES, 2001-2015
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In 2015, almost $7 billion of the total $9 billion in corporate penalties paid
to federal prosecutors came from banks. The two Appendices to this Essay
detail each of the prosecution agreements reached with banks and financial
institutions from 2001 to 2014, and then in 2015, as well as the penalties
imposed in each case. Over $22 billion in penalties have been paid to federal
prosecutors by financial institutions from 2001-2015; over $15 billion was paid
just in the last five years, from 2011 to 2015-9 The figure below depicts the
startling rise in penalties paid by financial institutions, defined to include
banks and other financial institutions like hedge funds and insurance
companies. One can see how few financial institutions were prosecuted from
2001-2014, with fewer than ten cases in each year prior to 2010. The first
9. In addition, banks have paid, by one estimate, almost $200 billion in at least 175 settlements
of enforcement actions since 2oo9, maldng the amounts paid as part of criminal
enforcement actions only a small fraction of the total. Jeff Cox, Misbehaving Banks Have Now
Paid $2o4B in Fines, CNBC (Oct. 30, 2015), http://www.cnbc.com/2o15/io/3o/misbehaving
-banks-have-now-paid-2o4b-in-fines.html [http://perma.cc/DCM6-N72F].
36
May 23 ,2016
THE RISE OF BANK PROSECUTIONS
billion-dollar criminal penalty was imposed on a bank (UBS) in 2009, and
many more have followed.o
Figure 2.
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION PROSECUTIONS AND PENALTIES, 2001-2015
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In 2015, a remarkable number of banks-eighty of them-finalized cases
with prosecutors. This constitutes about one-half of the organizations that
entered prosecution agreements during the entire year, whether plea
agreements" or deferred and non-prosecution agreements. Each of these bank
prosecutions is detailed in Appendix B." In 2015, bank prosecutions with large
fines, apart from the record-setting BNP Paribas case, included the cases of:
Deutsche Bank, which paid $625 million in an antitrust case; Commerzbank,
which paid $641 million; and Cr6dit Agricole, which paid $156 million in
money laundering and export violation cases. Upon closer inspection, it is not
10. Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. UBS AG, No. o9-60033-CR-COHN
(S.D. Fl. 2009), http://lib.law.virginia.edn/Garrett/prosecution agreements/sites/default
/files/pdf/ubs.pdf [http://perma.cc/L48G-GJRN].
n1. For the entire collection of such plea agreements, from 2001-2013, see Garrett & Ashley,
Federal Organizational Plea Agreements, supra note 8.
12. For the entire collection of such deferred and non-prosecution agreements, see Garrett &
Ashley, Federal Organizational Prosecution Agreements, supra note 8.
13. See infra Appendix B.
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surprising that $7 billion of $9 billion in fines levied by federal prosecutions in
2015 came from cases involving banks. The only really substantial settlements
from 2015 that did not involve banks were two that made up most of the $2
billion remainder: the $900 million paid by General Motors pursuant to a
deferred prosecution agreement and the $772 million paid by Alstom S.A. in a
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) case.4
The bulk of the banks that settled prosecutions in 2015 did so as part of a
"Swiss Bank Program," a remarkable effort by the DOJ's Tax Division
designed to combat marketing of illegal tax shelters. Scores of Swiss banks paid
almost $1 billion in these settlements of tax prosecutions in 2015. The DOJ's
Program was designed to give incentives, via non-prosecution agreements, to
the banks that fully cooperated and disclosed names of tax evaders in the U.S.
that the banks enabled.5 The unusual and one-off Swiss Bank program is
winding down, but in 2016 we will still see additional cases resolved with Swiss
banks that will not receive such lenient non-prosecution deals. The first such
settlement has been announced: Bank Julius Baer & Co. recently settled in a
deferred prosecution agreement and agreed to pay $547 million. 16
It is noteworthy how many financial institutions are now being
prosecuted-and with some regularity-such that they are no longer
functionally immune from criminal prosecution. In contrast to this recent
flurry of activity, very few financial institutions had been prosecuted in decades
past. It was almost vanishingly rare for banks to be convicted of crimes, as
Appendix A shows. From 2001-2012, I located just four bank convictions: those
of Cr6dit Lyonnais, Delta National Bank & Trust Co., Pamrapo Savings Bank,
14. Exhibit A, United States v. $900,000,000 in United States Currency, 1:15-cv-07342
(S.D.N.Y. 2015), http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/prosecutionagreements/sites/default
/files/pdf/gm.pdf [http://perma.cc/UBX2-RPYJ]; Plea Agreement, United States v. Alstom
S.A. (D. Conn. 2014), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases
/attachments/2ol4/12/22/alstom saplea agreement.pdf[http://perma.cc/9KH8-RCZC].
15. Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Announces Three Banks Reach
Resolutions under Swiss Bank Program (July 16, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr
/justice-department-announces-three-banks-reach-resolutions-under-swiss-bank-program
[http://perma.cc/M5VZ-ARP2].
16. Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Criminal Charges Filed Against Bank Julius Baer of
Switzerland with Deferred Prosecution Agreement Requiring Payment of $547 Million, as
Well as Guilty Pleas of Two Julius Baer Bankers (Feb. 4, 2016), http://www.justice.gov/opa
/pr/criminal-charges-filed-against-bank-julius-baer-switzerland-deferred-prosecution-agree
ment [http://perma.cc/58ER-KGRF]. The Department of Justice has made materials from
each of the Swiss Bank Program cases available on a very useful website. See Swiss Bank
Program, DEP'T JUST., http://www.justice.gov/tax/swiss-bank-program [http://perma.cc
/BG 4 S- 9 U 9 W].
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and Riggs Bank.1 7 In the past decade and before, when banks were charged,
they routinely received non-prosecution agreements not filed in court, much
less resulting in an indictment or a conviction, as Appendix A also depicts. It
was apparently a sign of additional vigilance that prosecutors slowly, in the
past few years, began to insist on deferred prosecution agreements for major
banks that are at least initially filed in court.' Prosecutors announced
convictions for SAC Capital in 2013, Japanese subsidiaries of UBS and Royal
Bank of Scotland in 2013, and Cr6dit Suisse and BNP Paribas in 2014.19 Now
prosecutors routinely pursue banks, and in some of the most serious cases, they
now seek a conviction through a guilty plea. Nevertheless, despite these
important changes, the question remains whether these agreements impose
adequate fines, function as deterrence, and facilitate the rehabilitation of banks
and bankers.
II. CRIMINAL FINES AND DETERRENCE OF BANK CRIME
These billions of dollars in fines imposed in recent years are not all that
they appear. The staggering fines cited above are dominated by a handful of
blockbuster cases, and should not suggest that federal prosecutors have
necessarily become more aggressive across the board.20 While bank
prosecutions have increased in number and size, in general, neither the number
of companies prosecuted nor the number of public companies prosecuted has
increased since 2001.2' The number of banks prosecuted had risen modestly,
particularly from 2011-2014, and then the numbers shot up due to the Swiss
17. Appendix A; GARRETT, Too BIG TO JAIL, supra note 5, at 349 n.16. In addition, several small
mortgage companies and investment advisors were convicted during that time period. See
Appendix A.
18. Ben Protess & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, JPMorgan Is Penalized $2 Billion Over Madoff N.Y.
TIMEs (Jan. 7, 2014, 9:37 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2ol4/ol/o7/jpmorgan-settles
-with-federal-authorities-in-madoff-case/ [http://perma.cc/UQ9T-XFMK] (observing that
"the size of the fine and the rarity of a deferred-prosecution agreement-such deals are
scarcely used against giant American banks and are typically employed only when
misconduct is extreme -reflect the magnitude of the accusations").
ig. GARRETT, Too BIG TO JAIL, supra note 5, at 258-59.
20. Average corporate fines have ranged from $i to $16,ooo,ooo from 2000-2012, far below the
fines imposed in the blockbuster cases involving hundreds of millions of dollars or even
billions in fines. See GARRETT, Too BIG TO JAIL, supra note 5, at 294 (describing an increase
in average corporate fines over the past two decades, from less than $2,000,000 in average
fines per year before 2000, to over $i,ooo,ooo in average corporate fines by 2010).
21. Id. at 261-62 (depicting numbers of federal corporate prosecutions from 1991 to 2012,
showing a rise in numbers prosecuted in the 1990s, but a decline since the 2000s, even
including cases resolved through deferred and non-prosecution agreements). To update that
data, there were i5o such prosecutions identified in 2013, and 126 in 2014, but 164 in 2015,
largely due to the Swiss Bank Program discussed infra.
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Bank Program cases in 2015. However, with the Swiss Bank Program winding
down, the number of bank prosecutions is likely to return to prior levels of
roughly ten per year in the future.
One might counter that it is not the number of cases but the size of the
penalties in the largest cases that has exponentially increased and should be our
focus. Yet even these fines are often not all that they could be. In general, in
almost half of the deferred and non-prosecution agreements with companies
from 2001-2012, no criminal fine was imposed at all.' When sentencing
calculations were provided, the agreements typically stated that fines were at
the bottom or below the bottom of the applicable range. I also found that for
public companies prosecuted from 2001-2012, fines averaged only 0.04 percent
of market capitalization, while total payments made to prosecutors averaged
just 0.09 percent.' To be sure, very few prosecutions of financial institutions,
as the Appendices illustrate, involve no criminal fine at all. However, from the
information disclosed, it appears the fines imposed were often dramatically
reduced. To provide one example: in the Standard Chartered case, the bank
admitted to having processed over $240 billion in illegal transactions with
Iranian clients, resulting in almost $7 billion in pre-tax profits, yet the bank
paid only $674 million in combined civil and criminal penalties.25
The largest criminal penalty of all time is another remarkable case in point.
The bulk of the corporate criminal fines in 2015 came from the single record-
shattering case of the French bank BNP Paribas, which paid $4 billion to
prosecutors and an additional almost $5 billion to regulators and local
prosecutors.2 The prosecutors described a pattern of years of deliberate
deception designed to conceal transactions with sanctioned regimes,
particularly with Sudan. Despite the fact that federal prosecutors highlighted
22. GARRETT, Too BIG TO JAIL, supra note 5, at 69.
23. Id. at 150 (noting that only thirty deferred or non-prosecution agreements from 2001-2012
included a guidelines calculation, and only three of those noted fines at the top of the
applicable range).
24. Id. at 70.
25. For a detailed discussion of the case, see Kristie Than, The Price offustice: Deferred Prosecution
Agreements in the Context of Iranian Sanctions, 28 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 631
(2014).
26. Plea agreement at 1-2, U.S. v. BNP Paribas S.A., June 27, 2015, at
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2014/06/30/plea-agreement.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F2XE-U2F3]; see also Press Release, Dep't of Justice, BNP Paribas
Sentenced for Conspiring to Violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and
the Trading with the Enemy Act
(May 1, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/bnp-paribas-sentenced-conspiring-violate
-international-emergency-economic-powers-act-and [http://perma.cc/Q628-2K5Y]. The
plea was negotiated in 2014 but the judgment was entered on May 1, 2015. Court Docket,
USA v. BNP Paribas S.A., Docket No. 1:14-cr-00460 (S.D.N.Y. July 09, 2014).
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how upper-level management condoned the sanctions violations and how
bankers tried to cover up the transactions -calling it "truly a tour de fraud" -
no individual bank employees were charged.' The almost $9 billion in
combined penalties -representing the total proceeds of the criminal activity
prosecutors felt they could prove moved through the U.S. financial system-
may have seemed quite large; even just the portion denominated as a criminal
penalty was record-sized. But in fact, over $190 billion in transactions may
have been involved, and the fine calculation was, as is typical in such cases,
highly non-transparent.8 Forfeiting just the proceeds of a crime is certainly a
starting point in a criminal case, but a corporation may also face fines of up to
double the gain (or harm to victims). 9 BNP paid only $140 million
denominated as a criminal fine for purposes of punishment; the remainder of
the payment was denominated as forfeiture 0 (although one advantage of that
denomination is that the funds may be used to compensate individuals "who
may have been harmed by the regimes of Sudan, Iran and Cuba" -an effort
that the DOJ is "exploring"). 1 Thus, the record penalty may actually be far
lower than what could have been imposed, and the lack of transparency in the
calculation of the fine amount makes it difficult to know how much larger the
fine could have been and what kind of bargain prosecutors struck.
III. BANK RECIDIVISM, DETERRENCE, AND REHABILITATION
Recidivism by major banks further calls into question the effectiveness of
these prosecution agreements. Federal prosecutors have repeatedly settled cases
with the same major banks in a short span of years. Recidivist financial
27. Ben Protess & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, BNP Paribas Admits Guilt and Agrees to Pay $8.9
Billion Fine to U.S., N.Y. TIMEs: DEALBOOK (June 30, 2014, 4:21 PM), http://dealbook
.nytimes.con/2o4/06/30/bnp-paribas-pleads-guilty-in-sanctions-case/ [http://perma.cc
/MZY8-C 7 9 2].
28. Press Release, Dep't ofJustice, BNP Paribas Agrees to Plead Guilty to Conspiring to Process
Transactions Through the U.S. Financial System For Sudanese, Iranian, and Cuban
Entities Subject To U.S. Economic Sanctions (June 30, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/usao-
sdny/pr/bnp-paribas-agrees-plead-guilty-conspiring-process-transactions-through-us-finan
cial [http://perma.cc/HCT7-NVT8]; Joseph Ax et al., U.S. Imposes Record Fine on BNP in
Sanctions Warning to Banks, REUTERS (July 1, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/us
-bnp-paribas-setdement-idUSKBNoF52HA20140701 [http://perma.cc/ZJ85-F5G8].
29. 18 U.S.C. § 3 57 1(d) (2012) (alternative fine based on gain or loss).
30. The forfeitures were under 18 U.S.C. 981(a)(1)(C) and 28 U.S.C. 2461(c). See Consent
Preliminary Order of Forfeiture, U.S. v. BNP Paribas S.A., No. 1:14-cr-00460-LGS,
(S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2o14/o6/3o
/consent-preliniinary-forfeiture-money-judgement.pdf [http://perma.cc/R3VW-Z7EU].
31. BNP Paribas Sentenced for Conspiring to Violate the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act and the Trading with the Enemy Act, supra note 26.
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institutions include AIG (deferred and non-prosecution agreements entered by
two subsidiaries in 2004 and a non-prosecution agreement in 2006), Barclays
(a deferred prosecution agreement in 2010, a non-prosecution agreement in
2012, and a guilty plea pending), Cr6dit Suisse (a deferred prosecution
agreement in 2009 and a plea agreement in 2014), HSBC (a non-prosecution
agreement in 2001 and a deferred prosecution agreement in 2012), JP Morgan
(a non-prosecution agreement in 2011, a deferred prosecution agreement in
2014, and a plea agreement pending currently), Lloyds (a deferred prosecution
agreement in 2009 and a deferred prosecution agreement in 2014), the Royal
Bank of Scotland (a deferred prosecution agreement in 2013, a guilty plea by a
subsidiary in 2013, and a guilty plea currently pending), UBS (a deferred
prosecution agreement in 2009, a non-prosecution agreement in 2011, a non-
prosecution agreement in 2012, a guilty plea by a subsidiary in 2013, and a
guilty plea currently pending), and Wachovia (a deferred prosecution
agreement in 2010 and a non-prosecution agreement in 2011).2 While the cases
cited are only the instances in which banks were repeatedly criminally
prosecuted, still more banks have settled multiple civil enforcement cases with
regulators (in some instances large numbers of civil cases)." One wonders how
seriously prosecutors take recidivism among major financial institutions and
how effective prosecutions have been in changing any underlying culture of
law-breaking.
32. For links to each of the pending plea agreements, see Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Five
Major Banks Agree to Parent-Level Guilty Pleas (May 20, 2015),
http://www.jusdce.gov/opa/pr/five-major-banks-agree-parent-level-guilty-pleas
[https://perma.cc/76FD-HC5H] [hereinafter Press Release, Five Major Banks]. The Royal
Bank of Scotland and UBS each had Japanese subsidiaries plead guilty in 2013 as described
here, see Press Release, Dep't of Justice, RBS Securities Japan Limited Agrees to Plead
Guilty in Connection with Long-Running Manipulation of Libor Benchmark Interest
Rates (Feb. 6, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/rbs-securities-japan-limited-agrees
-plead-guilty-connecdon-long-running-manipulation-libor [http://perma.cc/SV2B-XHL2];
United States v. UBS Securities Japan Co. Ltd, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov
/criminal-vns/case/ubssecurides [http://perma.cc/2W2X-97WT].
33. See Cox, supra note 9 (reporting results of study of bank penalties, noting that Bank of
America had settled thirty-four cases, paying $77 billion in penalties; JP Morgan Chase had
settled twenty-six cases, paying over $40 billion in penalties; and Citigroup had settled
eighteen cases, resulting in over $18 billion in penalties). Unlike criminal penalties,
however, civil settlements may be tax deductible-a source of criticism that civil penalty
amounts may be in part borne by taxpayers. See, e.g., Phineas Baxandall & Michelle Surka,
Settling for a Lack of Accountability?, U.S. PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP
EDUCATION FUND (Dec. 2015) http://www.uspirg.org/sites/pirg/files/reports/USPIRG
SettlementsReport.pdf [http://perma.cc/BAV6-LWHZ]; Aruna Viswanatha & David
Henry,JP Morgan Settlement Could Cost Bank Closer to $9 Billion, THOMPSON REUTERS (Oct.
22, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-jpmorgan-penalties-idUSBRE99L19720131022
[http://perma.cc/RL25-WCHE].
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Still more mammoth bank cases lumber along in the courts, including
several major pending cases that involve repeat-offender banks. In 2015, five
major banks agreed to plead guilty in cases relating to foreign exchange
(FOREX) currency manipulation. Those banks have not yet been sentenced
in the federal district court,5 but assuming the judge approves the negotiated
plea agreements in their current form, the banks will pay federal prosecutors $5
billion more in fines, making for another year of record-setting corporate and
bank penalties. Three of the banks -Barclays, JPMorgan and UBS -had been
previously prosecuted in recent years. Prosecutors did say that UBS, when
pleading guilty to the new FOREX violations in 2015, was in breach of an
earlier 2012 agreement regarding LIBOR manipulation. 6 UBS then paid a $203
million fine for that breach. Yet the puzzling consequence of the UBS breach of
its prior prosecution agreement was a far smaller fine than what the other banks
agreed to pay in the FOREX cases. 7 The consequences of recidivism appear
highly uneven. The outcomes suggest that the "too big to jail" argument -the
notion that banks are so vital to the economy that their crimes should be
excused or treated leniently- retains currency, and applies even to banks that
commit crimes repeatedly.
It is not clear that these banks are being rehabilitated through compliance
terms either. These terms aim to prevent future crimes in a way that the
payment of fines - ultimately borne by the shareholders - may not accomplish.
We know little about how the compliance terms of prosecution agreements are
being implemented, since the process is rarely described publicly by companies
or prosecutors, and the reports of independent monitors who are sometimes
tasked with supervising compliance are typically not made public.
The HSBC case is a rare case in which the summaries of monitor reports
have been made public because Judge John Gleeson insisted that there be some
reporting to the court."' As a result, we know that several years into the five-
34. See Press Release, Five Major Banks, supra note 32.
35. See, e.g., USA v. Barclays PLC, Docket No. 3:15-cr-00077 (D. Conn. May 20, 2015).
36. Id. ("According to the factual statement of breach attached to UBS's plea agreement, UBS
engaged in deceptive FX trading and sales practices after it signed the LIBOR non-
prosecution agreement ... ").
37. While UBS was in breach, it also received conditional immunity from prosecution for the
new violations since it reported them to prosecutors. Kevin McCoy & Kevin
Johnson, Five Banks Guilty of Rate-Rigging, Pay More than $5B, USA TODAY
(May 20, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/wlna/money/2o15/o5/2o/billions-in-bank-fx
-settlements/27638443/ [http://perma.cc/WL78-B533].
38. Judge Gleeson ordered an entire thousand-page monitor's report made public in the HSBC
case, calling it a "judicial document" relevant to his preliminary approval of the deferred
prosecution and subject to judicial supervision, and therefore subject to a public right of
access under the common law and the First Amendment. Memorandum and Order at 3-4,
United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. 12-CR-oo 7 63 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2016), ECF
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year term of a deferred prosecution agreement with HSBC, the monitor has
reported that compliance is still far from adequate and that reforms met with
outright resistance, including in HSBC's U.S. investment bank.39 The bank has
reported that the monitor identified additional "instances of potential financial
crimes." 40 The HSBC case raises the question of whether other independent
monitors have uncovered similar failures to comply, but in reports that have
not been made public. Major banks are massive institutions with global
operations, and without substantial compliance efforts, the process may
proceed slowly and with poor results. In more recent cases, prosecutors have
insisted on guilty pleas, with the result that banks are placed on probation,
with more formal court supervision, and with violation of probation as a
potential consequence of non-compliance. Whether stricter oversight of
compliance results from guilty pleas by banks remains to be seen.
Moreover, while banks pay fines, the actual bankers are not usually
charged, much less sentenced to any time, making the individual-level
deterrence of criminal conduct still more equivocal. I have found in a study of
individual prosecutions accompanying prosecution agreements that among the
306 deferred and non-prosecution agreements from 2001-2014, 66 cases
involved financial institutions, including commercial banks, investment banks,
insurance companies, and brokerages. Individual prosecutions of officers or
employees accompanied a little over one third or 23 of the 66 cases. Further,
the individuals prosecuted were typically low-level employees;' perhaps as a
No. 52. Judge Gleeson highlighted how the case involves "matters of great public concern,"
although partial sealing or redaction might be warranted if "narrowly tailored." Id. at 9-10.
That ruling is on appeal to the Second Circuit. Nate Raymond, HSBC Money Laundering
Report's Release Likely Delayed: U.S. Judge, REUTERs (Feb. 10, 2016), http://www.reuters
.com/article/us-hsbc-moneylaundering-idUSKCNoVI28H [http://perma.cc/656E-BVJV].
39. Greg Farrell, HSBC Falls Short on Compliance, Monitor to Report, BLOOMBERG
(Mar. 30, 2015 3:10 PM) http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2oS-o3-3o/hsbc-falls
-short-on-compliance-monitor-said-to-report [https://perma.cc/V3VC-YIVX5] (describing
a "critical, 1,ooo page report" by monitor which "raises doubts about how effective the
government's use of deferred- and non-prosecution agreements is in reining in wrongdoing
and changing culture at the world's largest banks"); Christie Smythe, Judge Lets Sun Shine
on Secret HSBC Money Laundering Report, BLOOMBERG Bus. (Jan. 29, 2016 12:00 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/aricles/2o16-ol-29/judge-lets-sun-shine-on-secret-hsbc
-report-on-money-laundering_[http://perma.cc/D7H3-CSP7].
40. HSBC's 2015 Annual Report noted that while the Monitor found that HSBC had made
"progress" in compliance, he also "expressed significant concerns about the pace
of that progress, instances of potential financial crime and systems and controls
deficiencies." Frances Coppola, HSBC's Catalogue ofLawsuits, FORBEs (Feb. 28, 2016,
10:23 AM EST), http://www.forbes.com/sites/francescoppola/2o16/o2/28/hsbcs-catalog-of
-lawsuits/#356cod9e4d27 [https://perma.cc/DR2W-2T2E].
41. Garrett, The Corporate Criminal, supra note s, at 1816.
42. Id. at 1802.
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result, these individual prosecutions generally resulted in fairly low sentences
for those that received any jail time.
In response to the widespread criticism, the non-prosecution of bank
employees may slowly be starting to change. The DOJ announced, as noted, a
set of new policies in fall 2015, revising charging guidelines and sharpening the
focus on individuals in corporate crime cases." A Delaware bank, Wilmington
Trust, was indicted and high-level officers charged, including the former
President and CFO.4s Two LIBOR rigging cases went to trial in the Southern
District of New York, resulting in convictions of former traders. To be sure,
none of these cases answers the criticism that bankers were not charged after
the last financial crisis; public concerns may understandably be more focused
on the conduct that preceded the financial crisis than more recent frauds or
violations with less potentially catastrophic consequences.4
CONCLUSION
Bank prosecutions, virtually unheard of before the past decade, now
dominate federal corporate criminal practice. Prosecutors in the United States
have taken on complex financial institutions like never before, and in a way
that their counterparts around the world have never done as aggressively. The
billion dollar fines that prosecutors now routinely negotiate, and the sheer
numbers of banks they target, send a deterrent message to the entire financial
industry. They also lead to perhaps more punitive results than the use of civil
43. Id. at 181o-11.
44. See Memorandum from Sally Yates, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to the
Heads of Dep't Components, U.S. Attorneys i (Sept. 9, 2015), http://www.justice.gov
/dag/file/769036/download [http://perma.cc/4U4P-JMGZ]; DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED
STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, § 9-28.ooo, Principles of Federal Prosecution Of Business
Organizations (revised in November 2015), http://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-28000
-principles-federal-prosecution-business-organizations [http://perma.cc/52EH- 9 UT7].
Then again, some predict prosecutors will over time "retreat" from an "all-or-nothing"
approach towards the Yates Memo. See Chris Bruce, U.S. Will Retreat on Yates Memo, Former
DOJ Official Predicts, BLOOMBERG L.: BANKING (Nov. 23, 2015), http://www.bna.com/us
-retreat-yates-n57982063844/ [https://perma.cc/KG9E-VCVQJ. Others, this author
included, have argued that in context these new changes are not dramatic. See Brandon L.
Garrett, The Metamorphosis of Corporate Criminal Prosecution, tot VA. L. REV. ONLINE 6o
(2015); Elizabeth E. Joh & Thomas W. Joo, The Corporation as Snitch: The New DOJ
Guidelines on Prosecuting White Collar Crime, tot VA. L. REV. ONLINE 51 (2015).
45. See Maureen Milford, Wilmington Trust Indictment Unique in Financial World, DELAWARE
ONLINE (Aug. 9, 2015), http://www.delawareonline.com/story/news/1ocal/2o5/o8/o9
/wilmington-trust-indictment-unique-financial-world/31394625/ [https://perma.cc/2WFK
-A44N].
46. For criticism focusing squarely on financial crisis related failures to prosecution, see, for
example, Rakoff, supra note 2 and Zaring, supra note 2.
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alternatives, such as enforcement actions brought under the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA),'
which has been responsible for the bulk of the civil penalties imposed on banks
post-financial crisis. The criminal penalties paid by banks in 2015 were no
aberration but part of a developing trend that is likely to continue in the years
to come, even if the numbers of banks prosecuted will likely decline with the
Swiss Bank Program winding down.
Despite the massive criminal penalties, it is hard to evaluate the significance
or adequacy of federal criminal prosecution efforts, and deep concerns remain.
Recidivists face little in the way of additional punishment; calculations of
penalties are non-transparent and fines may not even be as high as profits from
criminal acts; compliance changes are implemented with very little public
information; and individuals often remain unprosecuted. How can bank
prosecutions be used to deter banks better and to rehabilitate them to prevent
future crime? The move towards seeking guilty pleas from banks is an
important step in the right direction. In the past, banks could avoid
consequences for repeat criminal prosecutions since they lacked a criminal
record, having settled prior cases using non-prosecution or deferred
prosecution agreements. Now that prosecutors more often insist upon a
criminal conviction in the form of a guilty plea in front of a judge, future
violations may result in court-supervised compliance and penalties. The
compliance terms of these agreements should themselves be taken more
seriously, with public accountability in the form of monitors' reports, and
careful auditing of compliance to test its effectiveness. If banks know that
independent monitors will be testing compliance and reporting to a court and
to the public, the compliance may be far more rigorous. Finally, prosecution of
individuals may become more common if the new DOJ guidance takes hold
and results in more charging of culpable individuals. Whether that occurs
remains to be seen.
More resources may be dedicated to bank prosecutions, perhaps in future
administrations.' 8 Reform may also come from Congress, absent sufficient
changes in practice from within the DOJ, or through enhanced supervision by
federal judges. Federal legislation could require: (1) greater judicial supervision
47. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), Pub. L.
101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989). For an insightful and quite detailed analysis of the use of
FIRREA post-financial crisis, see Nan S. Ellis, Steven B. Dow & David Safavian, Use of
FIRREA To Impose Liability in the Wake of the Global Financial Crisis: A New Weapon in the
Arsenal To Prevent Financial Fraud, 18 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 119 (2015).
48. Presidential candidate Hillary Clinton has proposed dedicating still more resources towards
corporate and bank prosecutions, accompanying a shift in enforcement priorities.
See Hillary Clinton: Wall Street Should Work for Main Street, HILLARY FOR
AM., http://www.hillaryclinton.com/p/briefing/factsheets/2oi5/1o/o8/wall-street-work-for
-main-street [http://perma.cc/HR64-FEL8].
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of deferred prosecution agreements, including through revisions to the Speedy
Trial Act;49 (2) revisions to the organizational sentencing guidelines to ensure
deterrent fines; (3) longer statutes of limitations to assist in individual
prosecutions;50 and (4) greater transparency in corporate settlements, for
which legislation recently passed in the U.S. Senate.1 These improvements
would all be steps in the right direction, and might also give better incentives
to prosecutors to focus on individual prosecutions, more stringent compliance
oversight, and stronger penalties for recidivist corporations.
While real changes should be made to strengthen prosecutions of financial
institutions, I am also optimistic that the public and political scrutiny of these
cases will continue to push prosecutors to respond to the critics. If they do not,
other regulators, Congress, and the judiciary may step in. As never before,
prosecutors have made the targeting of banks centrally important as a tool for
safeguarding the public from fraud and money laundering; enforcement
actions against banking violations have grown; and post-Dodd-Frank 2
regulation of banks has steadily increased in its reach and complexity.3 Those
regulations, among other changes less related to criminal accountability,
incentivize whistleblowers to come forward, with the goal of encouraging
individuals within banks to report financial misconduct to regulators and to
prosecutors.' While the role of criminal law is and should be limited to only
the most severe misconduct, with civil enforcement addressing regulatory
violations, prosecutors have come to better appreciate the importance of
criminal accountability for truly serious financial crimes. The aftermath of the
financial crisis brought home how important it is for even the largest and the
49. For a discussion ofhow the Speedy Trial Act, Pub. L. 93-619, 88 Stat. 2076 (1975) (codified
at 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (2012)), permits any deferral of a prosecution and for a proposal that
organization-specific factors be added to the statute, see Garrett, The Corporate Criminal,
supra note 5, at 1842-44.
50. For a discussion of possible legislation regarding each of these topics, see Garrett, The
Corporate Criminal, supra note 5, at 1839-45.
51. The "Truth in Settlements Act" passed in the Senate on Sept. 21, 2015. See Truth in
Settlements Act, S. 1109, 114 th Cong. (as passed by Senate, Sept. 21, 2015).
52. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010).
53. For a description of the more than thousands of pages of regulations issued by federal
agencies to implement Dodd-Frank and areas in which regulations still have yet to be
drafted or finalized, see Dodd-Frank Progress Report, Third Quarter 2015, DAVIS
POLK, http://www.davispolk.com/sites/default/files/Q32015_Dodd.Frank .Progress.Report
.pdf [http://perma.cc/R8GV-USHJ].
54. For a description of the SEC Office of the Whistleblower, and the relevant statute and SEC
regulations, see, for example, 15 U.S.C. § 7 8u-6(h)(1)(B) (2012); Office of the
Whistleblower, Claim an Award, SEC. EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/about
/offices/owb/owb-awards.shtml [http://perma.cc/V99D-YFPB]; Final Rules, http://www
.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/reg-21f.pdf [https://perma.cc/JG3L-K5VX].
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most powerful banks and bankers to be held accountable, including for crimes.
In the future, hopefully the rise of bank prosecutions will result not just in
record monetary penalties, but also in lasting reforms that effectively prevent
the recurrence of serious financial crimes.
Brandon L. Garrett is a Justice Thurgood Marshall Distinguished Professor of Law,
University of Virginia School of Law. He would like to thank Ankur Desai for
superlative research assistance and to UVA reference librarian Jon Ashley for his
tireless and ongoing work assisting with data collection and maintaining online
resources concerning corporate prosecutions.
Preferred Citation: Brandon L. Garrett, The Rise ofBank Prosecutions, 126 YALE
L.J. F. 33 (2016), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/the-rise-of-bank
-prosecutions.
Appendix A.
FEDERAL BANK PROSECUTIONS, 2001-2014 (BY YEAR)
Conviction, Total Criminal
Company Year DP, or Crime" Criminal Fine Penaltrin
NP"
HSBC 2001 NP Secunrities $frand
BDO Seidman 2002 DP Accounting $o $32,000,000frand
Fulcrum Services, 2002 Conviction Money
Inc. Laundering
ist Union Transfer 2 C Money
and Telegraph, Inc. 2003 Conviction Laundering o $272,734
Banco Popular de Bank Secrecy $ $43,200,000
Puerto Rico 2003 DP Act
Canadian Imperial 2003 DP Accounting
Bank of Commerce fraud
55. DP refers to a
agreement.
deferred prosecution agreement and NP refers to a non-prosecution
56. The crime column describes the primary offense category if multiple criminal offenses were
named.
s. The total criminal penalty column includes sums denoted as a criminal fine, together with
any forfeiture, restitution, community service payment, or other sum paid to prosecutors.
That total penalty amount does not reflect additional sums paid separately to regulators,
non-federal prosecutors, or enforcement authorities in other countries.
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FalseMerrill Lynch 2003 NP Statements $o $950,000
AIG Financial Securities
Products Corp. 2004 NP fraud $8ooooooo $8ooooooo
AIG-FP PAGIC Securities
Equity Holding 2004 DP frauditie
Company
AmSouth Bancorp 2004 DP Bank Secrecy $40,000 $8o,oooAct
.. FalseCDR Enterprises 2004 Conviction Satee $o $oStatements
Consolidated
Brokerage 2004 Conviction Fraud $0 $0
Company, Inc.
Credit Lyonnais
Edward D. Jones
General Electric
(GE)
MAAF Assurances
S.A.
Bank of New York
Consolidated
Investments, Inc.
GAF Financial
Services Inc.
KPMG
Riggs Bank/ Riggs
National Corp
AIG
BankAtlantic
German Bank HVB
HealthSouth Corp.
Mellon Bank
Prudential Equity
Group, LLC
El Paso
2004 Conviction
2004 DP
2004 NP
2004 Conviction
2005 NP
2005 Conviction
2005 Conviction
2005 DP
2005 Conviction
2006 NP
2006 DP
2006 DP
2006 NP
2006 NP
2006 NP
2007 NP
False
Statements
Secunrities
frand
FCPA
False
Statements
Bank Secrecy
Act
Fraud
Money
Laundering
Tax
Money
Laundering
Securities
Fraud
Bank Secrecy
Act
Tax
Securities
Fraud
Theft
Securities
Fraud
FCPA
$100,ooo,ooo
$o
$16,000,000
$10,ooo,ooo
$38,000,000
$500,000
$0
$128,000,000
$16,ooo,ooo
$0
$10,ooo,ooo
$16,195,999
$o0
$18.130,ooo
$325,000,000
$5,482,363
$1oo000000
$o
$16,000,000
$76,000,000
$1,907,400
$o
$128,000,000
$16,ooo,ooo
$25,000,000
$10,00,000
$32,391,998
$o
$36,260,ooo
$325,000,000
$10,964,726
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American Express Securities
Bank Int'l 207rPaeuriieBnnt120 DPFraud $55,000,000 $iio,ooo,ooo
Blue Cross Blue
Shield of Rhode 2007 NP Fraud $0 $20,000,000
Island
Omega Advisors 2007 NP FCPA $500,000 $1,000,000
NETeller PLC 2007 DP Gambling $136,000,000 $272,000,000
Union Bank of Bank Secrecy $21,600,000 $43,200,000
California 2007 DP Act
United Bank for Obstruction $ $io,668,662
Africa 2007 NP ofJustice
Beacon Rock . . Securities
Capital LLC 2008 Conviction Fraud $6ooooo $6ooooo
E-Gold Ltd 2008 Conviction Money $600,000 $2,350,000Laundering
Pac Equities, Inc. 2oo8 Conviction Securities $0 $10,362,690Fraud
Sigile 2008 DP Bank Secrecy $o $30,000,000Act
Repblic Services, 2008 NP Immigration $i,ooo,ooo $5,ooo,oooInc.
Unum Group 2008 NP Fraud $5,550,000 $5,550,000
Alaska State
Mortgage 2009 Conviction Fraud $91,479 $91,479
Company
CapitalMoe
Management and 2009 Conviction Money $i2,800 $1,508,321
Asset Group Laundering
Credit Suisse AG 2009 DP IEEPA $o $536,000,000
Lloyds TSB Bankplcd 2009 DP IEEPA $o $350,000,000
Optimal Group 2009 NP Gambling $o $38,364,836
UBS AG 2009 DP Tax $o $1,16o,ooo,ooo
WellCare Health Health Care $o $16ooooooo
Plans, Inc. Fraud
ABN AMRO Bank
N.V. (now Royal 2010 DP Bank Secrecy $o $1,oo5,oooooo
Bank of Scotland Act
NV)
Barclays Bank 2010 DP IEEPA $o $298,000,000
BL Trading 2010 DP Fraud $o $364,810
DeutscheBankAG 2010 NP Tax $o $1,107,266,306
First FundingCrptnin, 2010 Conviction Tax $148,ooo $584,284Corporation, II
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General Secunrities $ $19,500,000
Reinsurance Corp. 2010 NP Fraud
Louis Berger 2010 DP Fraud $18,700,000 $18,700,000Group
Metropolitan Life ERISA
Insurance Co. 2010 NP violations $13,500,000 $13,500,000
(MetLife)
Pamrapo Savings 2010 Conviction Money $o
Bank Laundering
Trinity Trust
Financial Services, 2010 Conviction Fraud $0 $3,546,418
LLC
Wachovia 2010 DP Bank Secrecy $50,ooo,ooo $50,ooo,oooAct
Aon Corp. 2011 NP FCPA $1,764,000 $1,764,000
Bana ement LC 2011 DP Fraud $0 $24,224,832
CommunityOne 2011 DP Bank Secrecy $o $8ooo00
Bank Act
GE Funding
Capital Market 2011 NP Antitrust $40,000,000 $100,ooo,ooo
Services, Inc.
Islamic Investment
Co. of the Gulf 2011 NP Tax $4,508,000 $49,584,000
(Bahamas) Ltd.
JCMorgan Chase & 2011 NP Antitrust $o $o
Ocean Bank 2011 DP Bank Secrecy $o $21,996,000Act
UBS AG 2011 NP Antitrust $o $o
Wachovia 2011 NP Antitrust $o $o
Barclays BankPLC 2012 NP Fraud $16o,ooo,ooo $16o,ooo,ooo
BDO USA, LLP 2012 DP Tax $o $31,136,546
Diamondback Secnties
Capital 2012 NP Fraud $0 $12,000,000
Management, LLC
HSBC Bank
U.S.A., N.A., and Bank Secrecy $2,512,000,000
HSBC Holdings Act$o
plc
ING Bank, N.V. 2012 DP IEEPA $o $619,000,000
MoneyGram Int'l, Bank Secrecy $o $200,000,000
Inc. 2012 DP Act
UBS AG 2012 NP Fraud $400,000,000 $400,000,000
51
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL FORUM
Cooperatieve
Centrale
Raiffeisen- 2013 DP Fraud $325,000,000 $325,000,000
Boerenleenbank
B.A. ("Rabobank")
GB Check Cashing, 2013 Conviction Accounting $ $1,087,294
LLC Fraud
Liechtensteinische
Landesbanke 2013 NP Tax $o $23,841,542
Mercer S.M.E. Inc. 2013 Conviction Antitrust $15,ooo $15,ooo
Royal Bank of
Scotland plc 2013 DP Fraud $150,000,000 $150,000,000
UBS Securities
Japan Co. Ltd. 2013 Conviction Fraud $100,000,000 $100,000,400
Wegelin 2013 Conviction Fraud $22,050,000 $57,871,400
Bank Leumi Group 2014 DP Tax $41,230,695 $198,230,695
Credit Suisse 2014 Conviction Tax $1,136,988,986 $1,803,488,986
Jefferies Group
LLC 2014 NP Fraud $25,000,000 $25,000,000
JPMorgan Chase DP Bank Secrecy $o $1,700,000,000
Bank, N.A. 2014 Act
Lloyds Banldng
Group PLC 2014 DP Fraud $175,000,000 $175,000,000
Unlicensed
Oicoss, LLC 2014 Conviction Money $1,500,000 $1,500,000
Transfer
Sulnlrust
Mortgage, Inc. 2014 NP Fraud $0 $3,500,000
Swisspartners
Investment 2014 NP Antitrust $o $3,500,000
Network AG
52
May 23, 2016
THE RISE OF BANK PROSECUTIONS
Appendix B.
FEDERAL BANK PROSECUTIONS, 2015
Conviction Total CriminalCompany Year o s Crime" Criminal Fine Pe mil6o
Aarganlische
Kantonalbank 2015 NP Tax $1,983,000 $1,983,000
ARVEST Privatbank
AG 2015 NP Tax $1,044,000 $1,044,000
Banca Credinvest SA 2015 NP Tax $3,022,000 $3,022,000
Banca dello Stato del
Cantone Ticino 2015 NP Tax $3,393,000 $3,393,000
Banca Intermobiliare di
Investimenti e Gestioni
(Suisse) SA
Bank CIC (Schweiz)
Bank Coop, AG
BankEM
Genossenschaft
BankJ. Safra Sarasin
SA
Bank La Roche & Co.
AG
Bank Linth LLB AG
Bank Sparhafen Zurich
AG
Bank Zweiplus AG
Banque Bohhote & Cie
SA
Banque Cantonale du
Jura SA
Banque Cantonale du
Valais
Banque Cantonale du
2015
2015
2015
2015
2015
2015
2015
2015
2015
2015
2015
2015
2015
NP
NP
NP
NP
NP
NP
NP
NP
NP
NP
NP
NP
NP
Tax
Tax
Tax
Tax
Tax
Tax
Tax
Tax
Tax
Tax
Tax
Tax
Tax
$o0
$3,281,000
$3,223,000
$400,000
$85,809,000
$9,296,000
$4,150,000
$1,81o,ooo
$1,089,000
$624,ooo
$970,000
$2,311,000
$41,677,000
$o
$3,281,000
$3,223,000
$400,000
$85,809,000
$9,296,000
$4,150,000
$1,81o,ooo
$1,089,000
$624,ooo
$970,000
$2,311,000
$41,677,000
58. DP refers to a deferred prosecution agreement and NP refers to a non-prosecution
agreement.
59. The crime describes the primary offense category if multiple criminal offenses were named.
6o. The total penalty includes sums denoted as a criminal fine, together with any forfeiture,
restitution, community service payment, or other sum paid to prosecutors. That total
penalty amount does not reflect additional sums paid separately to regulators, non-federal
prosecutors, or enforcement authorities in other countries.
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Vaudoise
Banque Cantonale
Neuchateloise
Banque Heritage SA
Banque Internationale a
Luxembourg (Suisse)
SA
BanquePasche SA
Banque Privee Edmond
de Rothschild (Suisse)
SA & Banca Privata
Edmond de Rothschild
(Lugano) S
Baumann & Cie,
Banquiers
BBVA (Suiza) SA
Berner Kantonalbank
AG
BHF-Bank (Schweiz)
AG
BNP Paribas S.A.
BNP-Paribus (Suisse)
SA
Bordier & CIE
BSI SA
CommerceWest Bank
Commerzbank AG
Corner Banca SA
Courts & Co. Ltd.
Credit Agricole (Suisse)
SA
2015
2015
2015
2015
NP
NP
NP
NP
Tax
Tax
Tax
Tax
$1,123,000
$3,846,000
$9,710,000
$7,229,000
$1,123,000
$3,846,000
$9,710,000
$7,229,000
2015 NP Tax $45,245,000 $45,245,000
2015
2015
2015
2015
2015
2015
2015
2015
2015
2015
2015
2015
2015
NP
NP
NP
NP
Conviction
NP
NP
NP
DP
DP
NP
NP
NP
Tax
Tax
Tax
Tax
IEEPA
Tax
Tax
Tax
Bank
Secrecy
Act
Bank
Secrecy
Act
Tax
Tax
Tax
$7,700,000
$10,390,000
$4,619,000
$1,768,ooo
$140,000,000
$59,783,000
$7,827,000
$211,000,000
$1,000,000
$79,000,000
$5,o68,ooo
$78,484,000
$99,211,000
$7,700,000
$10,390,000
$4,619,000
$1,768,ooo
$4,486,800,400
$59,783,000
$7,827,000
$211,000,000
$2,219,783
$641,000,000
$5,o68,ooo
$78,484,000
$99,211,000
Credit Agricole
Corporate & 2015 DP IEEPA $o $156,000,000
Investment Bank
Credito Privato
Commerciale in 2015 NP Tax $348,900 $348,900
liquidazione SA
Deutsche Bank (Suisse)
SA 2015 NP Tax $31,026,000 $31,026,000
DeultscheBankAG 2015 DP Antitrust $625,000,000 $625,000,000
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Dreyfus Sons & Co.
Ltd. Banquiers 2015 NP Tax $2,161,ooo $2,161,ooo
E. Gutzwiller & Cie, 2015 NP Tax $1,556,000 $1,556,000
Banquiers
EFG Bank European
Financial Group SA,
Geneva (EFG Group) & 2015 NP Tax $29,988,000 $29,988,000
EFG BankAG (EFG
Bank)
ShaaseAG 2015 NP Tax $2,066,000 $2,066,000
Falcon Private BankAG 2015 NP Tax $i,8o6,ooo $i,8o6,ooo
Finacor S.A. 2015 NP Tax $295,000 $295,000
Finter Bank Zurich AG 2015 NP Tax $5,414,000 $5,414,000
Gonet & Cie 2015 NP Tax $11,454,000 $11,454,000
Graubundner
Kantonalbank 2015 NP Tax $3,616,000 $3,616,000
Habib Bank AG Zurich 2015 NP Tax $9,400,000 $9,400,000
Hong Kong
Entertainment Bank
(Overseas) 2015 NP Secrecy $o $3,036,969
Investments, Ltd. Act
Hyposwiss Private
Bank Geneve S.A. 2015 NP Tax $1,109,000 $1,109,000
Hypothekarbank
Lenzburg AG 2015 NP Tax $560,000 $560,000
KBL (Switzerland) Ltd. 2015 NP Tax $18,792,000 $18,792,000
LBBW (Schweiz) AG 2015 NP Tax $34,000 $34,000
Luzerner Kantonalbank
AG 2015 NP Tax $11,031,000 $11,031,000
Maerki Baumann &
Co., AG 2015 NP Tax $23,920,000 $23,920,000
MediBankAG 2015 NP Tax $826,000 $826,000
Mercantil Bank
(Schweiz) AG 2015 NP Tax $1,172,000 $1,172,000
Migros Bank AG 2015 NP Tax $15,037,000 $15,037,000
Nidwaldner
Kantonalbank 2015 NP Tax $856,000 $856,000
PBZ Verwaltungs AG 2015 NP Tax $5,570,000 $5,570,000
Piguet Galland & Cie
SA 2015 NP Tax $15,365,000 $15,365,000
PKB PrivatbankAG 2015 NP Tax $6,328,000 $6,328,000
PostFinanceAG 2015 NP Tax $2,000,000 $2,000,000
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PrivatbankBelleriveAG 2015 NP Tax $57,000 $57,000
Privatbank IHAG
Zurich AG 2015 NP Tax $7,453,000 $7,453,000
Privatbank Reichmuth
& Co. 2015 NP Tax $2,592,000 $2,592,000
Privatbank Von
Graffenried AG 2015 NP Tax $287,000 $287,000
Bank
Ripple Labs, Inc. 2015 NP Secrecy $o $450,000
Act
RothschildBankAG 2015 NP Tax $11,510,000 $11,510,000
SB Saanen BankAG 2015 NP Tax $1,365,000 $1,365,000
Schaffhaulser
Kantonalbank 2015 NP Tax $1,613,000 $1,613,000
Schroder & Co. Bank
AG 2015 NP Tax $10,354,000 $10,354,000
SCOBAG Privatbank
AG 2015 NP Tax $9,090 $9,090
Societe Generale Private
Banking (Lugano- 2015 NP Tax $1,363,000 $1,363,000
Svizzera) SA
Societe Generale Private
Banking (Suisse) SA 2015 NP Tax $17,807,000 $17,807,000
St. Galler
KantonalbankAG 2015 NP Tax $9,481,000 $9,481,000
Standard Chartered
Bank (Switzerland) SA 2015 NP Tax $6,337,000 $6,337,000
Vadian Bank AG 2015 NP Tax $o $4,253,000
ValiantBankAG 2015 NP Tax $3,304,000 $3,304,000
Zuger Kantonalbank 2015 NP Tax $3,798,000 $3,798,000
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